block checking out fork pr for some events

README.md

@@ -162,11 +162,8 @@ Please refer to the [release page](https://github.com/actions/checkout/releases/
     github-server-url: ''
 
     # Required to check out fork pull request code from a workflow triggered by
-    # `pull_request_target` or `workflow_run`. These workflows run with the base
-    # repository's GITHUB_TOKEN, secrets, default-branch cache scope, and runner
-    # access; fetching and executing a fork's code in that trusted context commonly
-    # leads to "pwn request" vulnerabilities. Set to `true` only after reviewing the
-    # risks at https://gh.io/securely-using-pull_request_target.
+    # `pull_request_target` or `workflow_run`. See [Pwn Requests](todo:need-link) for
+    # the risks. Set to `true` only after reviewing the risks.
     # Default: false
     allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: ''
 ```

__test__/unsafe-pr-checkout-helper.test.ts

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ const PR_MERGE_SHA = '2222222222222222222222222222222222222222'
 const SAFE_BASE_SHA = '3333333333333333333333333333333333333333'
 const WORKFLOW_RUN_HEAD_COMMIT_SHA = '4444444444444444444444444444444444444444'
 const BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO = 'some-owner/some-repo'
-const FORK_QUALIFIED_REPO = 'another-repo/fork'
 
 function setContext(eventName: string, payload: object): void {
   ;(github.context as {eventName: string}).eventName = eventName
@@ -26,7 +25,7 @@ function forkPullRequestTargetPayload(): object {
     pull_request: {
       head: {
         sha: PR_HEAD_SHA,
-        repo: {id: FORK_REPO_ID, full_name: FORK_QUALIFIED_REPO}
+        repo: {id: FORK_REPO_ID}
       },
       merge_commit_sha: PR_MERGE_SHA
     }
@@ -39,7 +38,7 @@ function sameRepoPullRequestTargetPayload(): object {
     pull_request: {
       head: {
         sha: PR_HEAD_SHA,
-        repo: {id: BASE_REPO_ID, full_name: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO}
+        repo: {id: BASE_REPO_ID}
       },
       merge_commit_sha: PR_MERGE_SHA
     }
@@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ function forkWorkflowRunPayload(): object {
     workflow_run: {
       event: 'pull_request',
       head_commit: {id: WORKFLOW_RUN_HEAD_COMMIT_SHA},
-      head_repository: {id: FORK_REPO_ID, full_name: FORK_QUALIFIED_REPO}
+      head_repository: {id: FORK_REPO_ID}
     }
   }
 }
@@ -165,7 +164,7 @@ describe('unsafe-pr-checkout-helper', () => {
     setContext('pull_request_target', forkPullRequestTargetPayload())
     expect(() =>
       assertSafePrCheckout({
-        qualifiedRepository: FORK_QUALIFIED_REPO,
+        qualifiedRepository: 'attacker/fork',
         ref: 'refs/heads/main',
         commit: '',
         allowUnsafePrCheckout: false
@@ -173,25 +172,13 @@ describe('unsafe-pr-checkout-helper', () => {
     ).toThrow()
   })
 
-  it('allows pull_request_target checkout of an unrelated third-party repo', () => {
-    setContext('pull_request_target', forkPullRequestTargetPayload())
-    expect(() =>
-      assertSafePrCheckout({
-        qualifiedRepository: 'some-other/unrelated',
-        ref: 'refs/heads/main',
-        commit: '',
-        allowUnsafePrCheckout: false
-      })
-    ).not.toThrow()
-  })
-
   it('refuses pull_request_target ignoring repository case differences', () => {
     setContext('pull_request_target', forkPullRequestTargetPayload())
     expect(() =>
       assertSafePrCheckout({
-        qualifiedRepository: FORK_QUALIFIED_REPO.toUpperCase(),
+        qualifiedRepository: 'SOME-OWNER/SOME-REPO',
         ref: '',
-        commit: '',
+        commit: PR_HEAD_SHA,
         allowUnsafePrCheckout: false
       })
     ).toThrow()

action.yml

@@ -101,11 +101,8 @@ inputs:
   allow-unsafe-pr-checkout:
     description: >
       Required to check out fork pull request code from a workflow triggered by
-      `pull_request_target` or `workflow_run`. These workflows run with the
-      base repository's GITHUB_TOKEN, secrets, default-branch cache scope, and
-      runner access; fetching and executing a fork's code in that trusted
-      context commonly leads to "pwn request" vulnerabilities. Set to `true`
-      only after reviewing the risks at https://gh.io/securely-using-pull_request_target.
+      `pull_request_target` or `workflow_run`. See [Pwn Requests](todo:need-link)
+      for the risks. Set to `true` only after reviewing the risks.
     default: false
 outputs:
   ref:

dist/index.js

@@ -2793,11 +2793,9 @@ function assertSafePrCheckout(input) {
         return;
     }
     let prHeadRepoId;
-    let prHeadRepoFullName;
     const prShas = [];
     if (eventName === 'pull_request_target') {
         prHeadRepoId = (0, ref_helper_1.fromPayload)('pull_request.head.repo.id');
-        prHeadRepoFullName = (0, ref_helper_1.fromPayload)('pull_request.head.repo.full_name');
         pushIfSha(prShas, (0, ref_helper_1.fromPayload)('pull_request.head.sha'));
         pushIfSha(prShas, (0, ref_helper_1.fromPayload)('pull_request.merge_commit_sha'));
     }
@@ -2807,13 +2805,7 @@ function assertSafePrCheckout(input) {
             return;
         }
         prHeadRepoId = (0, ref_helper_1.fromPayload)('workflow_run.head_repository.id');
-        prHeadRepoFullName = (0, ref_helper_1.fromPayload)('workflow_run.head_repository.full_name');
         pushIfSha(prShas, (0, ref_helper_1.fromPayload)('workflow_run.head_commit.id'));
-        // For `pull_request_target`-triggered workflow_run, `head_sha` is the base
-        // default branch SHA (not the PR head)
-        if (wrEvent !== 'pull_request_target') {
-            pushIfSha(prShas, (0, ref_helper_1.fromPayload)('workflow_run.head_sha'));
-        }
     }
     // (A) Fork PR?
     if (typeof prHeadRepoId !== 'number' || prHeadRepoId === baseRepoId) {
@@ -2821,20 +2813,20 @@ function assertSafePrCheckout(input) {
     }
     // (B) We cannot check for all fork PR refs so check to see
     // if the resolved input points to the fork PR sha we have in the payload
-    const repositoryMatchesPrHead = typeof prHeadRepoFullName === 'string' &&
-        input.qualifiedRepository.toLowerCase() === prHeadRepoFullName.toLowerCase();
+    const baseQualifiedRepository = `${github.context.repo.owner}/${github.context.repo.repo}`;
+    const repositoryDiffersFromBase = input.qualifiedRepository.toLowerCase() !==
+        baseQualifiedRepository.toLowerCase();
     const refMatchesPullPattern = PR_REF_PATTERN.test(input.ref);
     const commitMatchesPrHeadSha = !!input.commit && prShas.includes(input.commit.toLowerCase());
-    if (!repositoryMatchesPrHead &&
+    if (!repositoryDiffersFromBase &&
         !refMatchesPullPattern &&
         !commitMatchesPrHeadSha) {
         return;
     }
     throw new Error(`Refusing to check out fork pull request code from a '${eventName}' workflow. ` +
         `This workflow runs with the base repository's GITHUB_TOKEN, secrets, default-branch ` +
-        `cache scope, and runner access. Fetching and executing a fork's code in that trusted ` +
-        `context commonly leads to "pwn request" vulnerabilities. To opt in after reviewing ` +
-        `the risks at https://gh.io/securely-using-pull_request_target, set ` +
+        `cache scope, and runner access. Fetching fork's code in that trusted context is a ` +
+        `"pwn request" supply-chain attack pattern. To opt in after reviewing the risk, set ` +
         `'allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true' on the actions/checkout step.`);
 }
 function pushIfSha(target, value) {

package-lock.json

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
         "@actions/github": "^6.0.0",
         "@actions/io": "^1.1.3",
         "@actions/tool-cache": "^2.0.1",
-        "flatted": "^3.4.2",
         "uuid": "^9.0.1"
       },
       "devDependencies": {
@@ -3591,10 +3590,10 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/flatted": {
-      "version": "3.4.2",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/flatted/-/flatted-3.4.2.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-PjDse7RzhcPkIJwy5t7KPWQSZ9cAbzQXcafsetQoD7sOJRQlGikNbx7yZp2OotDnJyrDcbyRq3Ttb18iYOqkxA==",
-      "license": "ISC"
+      "version": "3.3.1",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/flatted/-/flatted-3.3.1.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-X8cqMLLie7KsNUDSdzeN8FYK9rEt4Dt67OsG/DNGnYTSDBG4uFAJFBnUeiV+zCVAvwFy56IjM9sH51jVaEhNxw==",
+      "dev": true
     },
     "node_modules/for-each": {
       "version": "0.3.3",

package.json

@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@
     "@actions/github": "^6.0.0",
     "@actions/io": "^1.1.3",
     "@actions/tool-cache": "^2.0.1",
-    "flatted": "^3.4.2",
     "uuid": "^9.0.1"
   },
   "devDependencies": {

src/unsafe-pr-checkout-helper.ts

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ const PR_REF_PATTERN = /^refs\/pull\/[0-9]+\/(?:head|merge)$/
 export interface IUnsafePrCheckoutInput {
   qualifiedRepository: string
   ref: string
-  commit: string | undefined
+  commit: string
   allowUnsafePrCheckout: boolean
 }
 
@@ -26,12 +26,10 @@ export function assertSafePrCheckout(input: IUnsafePrCheckoutInput): void {
   }
 
   let prHeadRepoId: unknown
-  let prHeadRepoFullName: unknown
   const prShas: string[] = []
 
   if (eventName === 'pull_request_target') {
     prHeadRepoId = fromPayload('pull_request.head.repo.id')
-    prHeadRepoFullName = fromPayload('pull_request.head.repo.full_name')
     pushIfSha(prShas, fromPayload('pull_request.head.sha'))
     pushIfSha(prShas, fromPayload('pull_request.merge_commit_sha'))
   } else {
@@ -40,13 +38,7 @@ export function assertSafePrCheckout(input: IUnsafePrCheckoutInput): void {
       return
     }
     prHeadRepoId = fromPayload('workflow_run.head_repository.id')
-    prHeadRepoFullName = fromPayload('workflow_run.head_repository.full_name')
     pushIfSha(prShas, fromPayload('workflow_run.head_commit.id'))
-    // For `pull_request_target`-triggered workflow_run, `head_sha` is the base
-    // default branch SHA (not the PR head)
-    if (wrEvent !== 'pull_request_target') {
-      pushIfSha(prShas, fromPayload('workflow_run.head_sha'))
-    }
   }
 
   // (A) Fork PR?
@@ -56,15 +48,16 @@ export function assertSafePrCheckout(input: IUnsafePrCheckoutInput): void {
 
   // (B) We cannot check for all fork PR refs so check to see
   // if the resolved input points to the fork PR sha we have in the payload
-  const repositoryMatchesPrHead =
-    typeof prHeadRepoFullName === 'string' &&
-    input.qualifiedRepository.toLowerCase() === prHeadRepoFullName.toLowerCase()
+  const baseQualifiedRepository = `${github.context.repo.owner}/${github.context.repo.repo}`
+  const repositoryDiffersFromBase =
+    input.qualifiedRepository.toLowerCase() !==
+    baseQualifiedRepository.toLowerCase()
   const refMatchesPullPattern = PR_REF_PATTERN.test(input.ref)
   const commitMatchesPrHeadSha =
     !!input.commit && prShas.includes(input.commit.toLowerCase())
 
   if (
-    !repositoryMatchesPrHead &&
+    !repositoryDiffersFromBase &&
     !refMatchesPullPattern &&
     !commitMatchesPrHeadSha
   ) {
@@ -74,9 +67,8 @@ export function assertSafePrCheckout(input: IUnsafePrCheckoutInput): void {
   throw new Error(
     `Refusing to check out fork pull request code from a '${eventName}' workflow. ` +
       `This workflow runs with the base repository's GITHUB_TOKEN, secrets, default-branch ` +
-      `cache scope, and runner access. Fetching and executing a fork's code in that trusted ` +
-      `context commonly leads to "pwn request" vulnerabilities. To opt in after reviewing ` +
-      `the risks at https://gh.io/securely-using-pull_request_target, set ` +
+      `cache scope, and runner access. Fetching fork's code in that trusted context is a ` +
+      `"pwn request" supply-chain attack pattern. To opt in after reviewing the risk, set ` +
       `'allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true' on the actions/checkout step.`
   )
 }